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Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Evidence
from a Randomized Intervention in New York City
Albert H. Fang, Yale University
Andrew M. Guess, Princeton University
Macartan Humphreys, WZB Social Science Center Berlin and Columbia UniversityRacial discrimination persists despite established antidiscrimination laws. A common government strategy to deter
discrimination is to publicize the law and communicate potential penalties for violations. We study this strategy by
coupling an audit experiment with a randomized intervention involving nearly 700 landlords in NewYork City and report
the first causal estimates of the effect on rental discrimination against blacks and Hispanics of a targeted government
messaging campaign.We uncover discrimination levels higher than prior estimates indicate, especially against Hispanics,
who are approximately 6 percentage points less likely to receive callbacks and offers than whites. We find suggestive
evidence that government messaging can reduce discrimination against Hispanics but not against blacks. The findings
confirm discrimination’s persistence and suggest that government messaging can address it in some settings, but more
work is needed to understand the conditions under which such appeals are most effective.The passage of civil rights laws in the 1960s marked aturning point in the development of racial politics inthe United States. Against the historical backdrop of
slavery, Jim Crow, long-standing racial inequalities, and the
marginalization of nonwhites, the legal prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin sig-
naled an important political shift toward a more egalitarian
racial order (King and Smith 2005;Massey andDenton 1993).
In addition to examining the political conditions leading to
the passage of civil rights laws, scholars examining the poli-
tics surrounding the formal end of Jim Crow have focused
on its aftermath. Scholars have documented how racial in-
equalities have persisted, and they have offered numerousAlbert H. Fang (albert.fang@yale.edu) is a postdoctoral associate in the Institutio
Andrew M. Guess (aguess@princeton.edu) is an assistant professor of politics a
Humphreys (mh2245@columbia.edu) is a professor of political science at Colum
tutions and Political Inequality research unit at the WZB Social Science Center
This research and the authors’ involvement with the City of New York in this
ingside Institutional Review Board (protocols IRB-AAAI4007 and IRB-AAAN40
Governance and Politics registry on April 3, 2013, while data collection was ong
from this analysis plan is provided in supplementary materials sec. F.3. This
Commission on Human Rights, the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF Award no. 87-
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in t
/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at
1. We focus on understanding the incidence of discrimination and set aside q
sociology (e.g., Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan 2005; Heckman 1998; Heck
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q 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms policy-centered, political economy explanations for their per-
sistence (e.g., Alexander 2012; Forman 2012). Central to these
explanations is the argument that racial disparities persist be-
cause racial discrimination is both pervasive and persistent
despite established civil rights laws (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith
1997; Dawson 2016; Dawson and Francis 2015). This calls
into question the role of government in enforcing these laws,
as well as the downstream consequences of government ac-
tion (or inaction) for racial inequalities, the political economy
of race, and the development of racial orders.
Understanding this puzzle requires pursuing two related
lines of inquiry. The first asks: To what extent does racial
discrimination persist and why?1 The first-order challenge ofn for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520
nd public affairs at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. Macartan
bia University, New York, NY 10027 and research director of the Insti
Berlin, Germany.
research were reviewed and approved by the Columbia University Morn
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oing but before any analysis (ID 20130403AA). A discussion of deviations
study was conducted with the generous support of the New York City
13-02), and the Columbia Center for the Study of Development Strategies
he article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/700107.
uestions about its causes, which have been widely studied in economics and
man and Siegelman 1993; Pager and Karafin 2009).
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and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c)..
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.
2. Of the 18,978 housing discrimination complaints reported by pri-
vate fair housing groups in 2014, 16,694 (or about 88%) occurred in the
rental market (National Fair Housing Alliance 2014).
3. For simplicity, we refer to subjects, defined as landlords or brokers
associated with a sampled rental housing ad and who interact with a
matched team of testers, simply as “landlords.”
128 / Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Albert H. Fang, Andrew M. Guess, and Macartan Humphreysmeasuring discrimination levels is not trivial. For its potential
targets, discrimination is difficult to detect because in many
cases it is impossible to observe how a counterfactual indi-
vidual would be treated in a market interaction. Going beyond
firsthand accounts, relying on third-party reports is imperfect
because they require unobtrusive observation and, as prior
psychological research has documented,many individuals are
unwilling to “see” ormake attributions to discrimination even
when confronted with direct evidence of it (Major and Dover
2016). To address this challenge, governments use enforce-
ment audits to collect evidence of discrimination on a case-by-
case basis, and both scholars and governments have relied on
audit studies to measure the aggregate-level incidence of dis-
crimination in employment and housing (see Bertrand and
Duflo 2017; Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky 2017; Pager and
Shepherd 2008; Turner et al. 2013). High-quality audits are,
however, both costly and relatively rare. Most audit studies
focus on discrimination in early stage market interactions but
do not measure end-line outcomes (such as being offered a
job or a housing unit), which are important to measure be-
cause they are key indicators of disparate impact.
The second, related line of inquiry asks:Which government
strategies are effective at reducing discrimination and why? De-
spite an abundance of theoretical work on policy enforcement
in general and research on the primacy of legal strategies in
efforts to enforce antidiscrimination laws since their initial
passage (see Cover 1995; Epp 1998; Frymer 2003; Rosenberg
1991; Skrentny 2002), to our knowledge no work exists that
assesses whether governmental strategies to reduce discrimi-
nation are effective. Answering this second question is doubly
difficult, as it requires measuring a hidden behavior and causal
inferences around those behaviors.
In this article, we address both of these major questions
and provide a first attempt to experimentally test the effects
on racial discrimination levels of any government strategy to
reduce them in the United States.We study the effectiveness of
preemptive strategies to deter racial discrimination using of-
ficial communicationcampaigns encouragingcompliancewith
antidiscrimination law.We examine two commonly employed
but understudied appeals: making the law itself salient and
making the costs of violating the law salient.Weworkat a large
scale that offers a good handle on discrimination levels, al-
though, given fundamental measurement and inferential chal-
lenges, our treatment effect estimates are still measured with
considerable uncertainty.
Our analysis examines discrimination and interventions
in field conditions, in the context of government efforts to
enforce fair housing law in the New York City rental mar-
ket. We focus on the rental market as it is the segment of theAll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms housing market in which reported discrimination is the most
pervasive.2 We partnered with the New York City municipal
government to implement a large-scale field experiment that
began in 2012 and lasted 20 months. We assess the effects on
racial discrimination levels against black and Hispanic rental
applicants (as compared to whites) of government appeals that
are delivered via targeted and personalized phone calls to land-
lords and brokers who interact with confederates posing as
rental housing applicants.3 The city randomly assigned to
nearly 700 landlords either (1) a targeted live phone call from
the city that drew attention to fair housing law and implicitly
signaled increased government monitoring of housing agents
(a “monitoring” condition), (2) a targeted live phone call with
the contents of the monitoring message and additional infor-
mation about the potential pecuniary punishments for discrim-
inatory practices (a “punitive” condition), or (3) no call from
the city (a pure control condition). The city then sent matched
triples of confederates who varied by race (black, Hispanic,
and white) to visit the same advertised unit—meeting in per-
son with the same landlord—and to collect detailed qualita-
tive notes on their interactions over the course of the housing
search process. The enhanced audit design embedded in the
experiment provides leverage above and beyond existing audit
methodologies to measure both subtle and direct forms of
racial bias that pervade the housing market. Additionally, in
contrast to prior housing audit studies focusing on differen-
tial treatment in landlords’ responses to initial inquiries about
rental listings, this study focuses on two outcomes occurring
toward the end of the housing search process that are conse-
quential for downstream housing inequalities: discrimination
in receiving a callback following an in-person meeting with the
landlord to view the listed unit and discrimination in receiv-
ing a rental offer from the landlord after the appointment.
The theoretical framework motivating the experiment is
relatively simple. Drawing on existing research, we expect
that the monitoring condition should decrease racial dis-
crimination levels relative to a control, because receiving a
personally targeted monitoring signal from a government
known to actively enforce fair housing law is expected to
reduce landlords’ perceived benefits from discriminating
and to increase their perceptions of the probability of pun-
ishment if they discriminate. By contrast, existing researchand Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 81 Number 1 January 2019 / 129offers mixed expectations about the conditions under which
coercive sanctions induce pro-social behavior, with some pro-
posing possibly adverse effects; thus, we are agnostic about the
expected direction of the punitive messaging effect.
We find evidence of substantial baseline levels of discrim-
ination in the New York City rental housing market, partic-
ularly against Hispanics: they are 28% less likely to receive
a callback (6.1 percentage points, 95% confidence interval,
CI p ½1:00; 11:19) and 49% less likely to receive an offer for
an apartment than whites (5.7 percentage points, 95% CI p
½1:32; 10:16). This result is striking when compared to dis-
crimination levels reported by the 2012 US Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) audit of racial
rental discrimination in the New York metropolitan area,
which found a lack of discrimination against minorities in
receiving callbacks (discrimination in receiving offers was not
studied).4 We show that racial discrimination in fact persists in
the New York City rental market. We also find suggestive
evidence that treatment messages reduce levels of discrimina-
tion in receiving callbacks, although these effects are statisti-
cally weak and are observed only for discrimination against
Hispanics. There is no evidence that discrimination against
blacks is affected by these government messaging interven-
tions. We also find no evidence that the punitive messages are
more or less effective than simple monitoring messages. Our
results suggest that a bundled governmental messaging strat-
egy that invokes fair housing law and makes salient the costs
of punishment for lawbreakers can be effective at reducing racial
housing discrimination, but not under all circumstances. As a
whole, this study makes the case that evaluating government
efforts to reduce racial discrimination is central to understand-
ing the political economy of race and motivates the need for
additional future research on the conditions under which
government efforts to enforce antidiscrimination laws and
reduce discrimination are effective.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EXPECTATIONS
Government strategies to reduce racial
discrimination in the United States
Government strategies to enforce antidiscrimination lawmay
be classified into one of two broad types: reactive or pre-
emptive. Reactive strategies such as “fire alarm” and “police
patrol”models of policy enforcement (McCubbins and Schwartz
1984) are those in which governments investigate and litigate4. The estimates from both samples condition on matched testers
making an appointment, but the samples also differ. The 2012 HUD study
had a larger initial sampling frame (including northern New Jersey and
units found through non-Craigslist means), whereas our sample is larger
yet only includes New York City rental listings from Craigslist.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms potential discriminators as an ex post response conditional
on citizens and governments, respectively, observing and re-
porting discrimination in the first place. Given the challenges
with observing discrimination (as previously discussed) and
the expectation that pursuing litigation may incur dispropor-
tionate financial and psychological costs on the targets of dis-
crimination relative to defendants (Donohue and Siegelman
1991; Feagin 1991; Galanter 1974), reactive strategies are lim-
ited in their ability to identify, much less punish, most who
discriminate.
In contrast, preemptive strategies are those where offi-
cial messaging campaigns attempt to deter discrimination
ex ante, by advertising existing antidiscrimination laws and
making various appeals that attempt to induce compliance
with the law. Such campaigns complement reactive strategies
and are attractive in part because, if effective, they could of-
fer a lower-cost method to induce behavioral change (as com-
pared to deploying an intensive enforcement audit program).
Existing government communication campaigns typically in-
volve bundled messages and appeals that aim to reach mul-
tiple potential audiences including the targets of discrimina-
tion, discriminators, and third-party observers. Evaluating
existing bundled government campaigns does not provide
leverage to understand why enforcement efforts are effective,
however, because it would not be possible to infer whether
potential lawbreakers decide to comply with the law because
they perceive the costs of violating the law to outweigh the
benefits (Wilson 1980). To disentangle the effects of different
governmental appeals on individuals whose behavior fair
housing laws ultimately aim to change, we focus on testing
whether governmental appeals that directly target potential
discriminators (i.e., landlords and brokers) and that are de-
signed to alter their expected returns to discriminating are
effective at inducing behavioral change.
When do messaging campaigns reduce
discriminatory behavior?
Under what conditions might government messaging cam-
paigns be effective at reducing discriminatory behavior? Ex-
isting research undertheorizes why official appeals would be
effective at reducing discrimination. We develop a simple
decision-theoretic model to clarify the basic logic. In the con-
text of a housing market interaction, the individual of in-
terest is the landlord or broker who interacts with housing
applicants and may potentially engage in discriminatory be-
havior. Discrimination (as an individual-level behavior) sim-
ply refers to the differential treatment of two individuals who
vary on a relevant attribute such as race. This definition is ag-
nostic as to why people discriminate, which may arise becauseand Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
130 / Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Albert H. Fang, Andrew M. Guess, and Macartan Humphreyspeople hold group-specific prejudices and a taste for discrim-
ination (Becker 1957) or because people engage in statistical
discrimination by relying on average group stereotypes to
make inferences about a person perceived to belong to that
group (e.g., Aigner and Cain 1977; Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972).
Let individual i’s utility from discrimination given govern-
ment policy x be expressed as ui(x) p bi(x)2 pi(x)ci(x)1 ei,
where bi denotes marginal benefits from discriminating, pi
the subject’s expectation of punishment when she discrimi-
nates, ci the expected severity of the punishment, and ei indi-
vidual heterogeneity. If bi(x) 1 pi(x)ci(x), then i will discrim-
inate.
Building on this framework, we aim to estimate both the
baseline level of housing discrimination against black and
Hispanic renters as well as the causal effects on racial hous-
ing discrimination of governmental messaging that encour-
ages landlords and brokers to comply with fair housing law.
We investigate these quantities separately for blacks and for
Hispanics because in multiracial contexts, there are multi-
ple dimensions of social difference that are potentially sa-
lient, and the nature of bias against a racial group is expected
to vary as a function of how each group is perceived to deviate
from a majority reference group (e.g., Dovidio et al. 2010;
Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009).5 We examine two dis-
tinct types of policy: a monitoring signal that invokes the law
and implicitly signals increased government monitoring of
housing agents, and a punitive appeal that additionally primes
the costs of discrimination. For practical reasons—in partic-
ular to satisfy our implementing partner’s preference for treat-
ment realism and to avoid depleting statistical power—the
experiment is designed to test realistic, bundled treatments
but does so at the expense of testing specific parameters. We
are cognizant that this is a major limitation of this study and
recommend future work to test treatments that target each
parameter separately. This framework is nevertheless useful
to develop expectations about why the appeals we test would
affect discrimination.
We test the hypotheses that sending monitoring messages
alone decreases rental housing discrimination rates against
blacks and Hispanics (hypothesis family H1). There are two
possible reasons for why it might. First, simply contacting
landlords and making the law salient may raise expectations
of sanctioning, p, even if this is not explicitly invoked and no
information on sanctions is provided. Given the context of5. Our study therefore addresses the need for additional research on
discrimination against Hispanics (Dovidio et al. 2010) and the need to
study discrimination against multiple groups in the same study to un-
derstand discrimination in a multiracial context, which is rare in the lit-
erature.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms this study, the mode of treatment delivery, and the particular
messenger of the treatment appeal, we argue that this is plau-
sible in this experimental setting. Because the treatment calls
in this study are personalized and targeted and because they
are sent by a city government known to have the capacity
and willingness to monitor and enforce fair housing law, re-
ceiving such a call provides a strong and credible signal to the
landlord that the city is already monitoring them. Thus, re-
ceiving any targeted call from the city may increase p above
zero.
Increasing the salience of injunctive norms about fair
housing in the landlord’s thinking may also reduce b. Simply
invoking the law may activate compliance norms and may
also render compliance focal (McAdams and Nadler 2005;
Tyler 2006). For discrimination in particular, Mendelberg
(2001) and others have highlighted how explicit priming of
discrimination considerations can result in less discrimina-
tion (relative to implicit priming) due to invoking social non-
discrimination norms. If housing agents perceive discrimi-
nation to be a descriptive norm, then these perceptions may
drive beliefs that the law is illegitimate and result in less com-
pliance (Tyler 2004, 2006). But appeals to injunctive norms
have been theorized to be effective at crowding out descriptive
norm perceptions used to justify noncompliance (Weaver
2015). Our estimates of the monitoring effect thus capture
joint effects on p and, to the extent that preferences are not
fixed, b.
In addition, we study the effect of altering c by assessing
the effect of sending “punitive”messages, relative both to the
control condition (thus the combined effect of monitoring
and punitive content) and to the monitoring condition (thus
the additional effect of punitive content as compared to the
monitoring condition). Thus, in practice we assess the hypoth-
eses that sending punitive messages decreases rental housing
discrimination rates against blacks and Hispanics relative to
the baseline condition and to a monitoring condition (hypoth-
esis family H2).6 Although we have clear expectations about
the marginal effect of costs, c, we are cognizant that our pu-
nitive treatment may also have the effect of altering b, rel-
ative to the monitoring treatment.
Existing research suggestsmixed expectations about whether
amplifying the salience of the severity of punishment will be
effective at reducing discrimination. On the one hand, the-
oretical work on the politics of inducing behavioral policy
compliance argues that when individuals face insufficient in-
centives to comply or perceive complying as costly, a poten-
tially effective strategy to induce compliance involves increas-6. The latter comparison can be interpreted as the pure effect of ex-
plicitly priming punishment.
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
7. Full details about the sampling, audit, and field procedures are pro-
vided in the appendix.
8. All LD ads were pursued (n p 156), and of these, 44 were associ-
ated with landlords admitted into the experiment. To address concerns
that their inclusion increases discrimination levels in the control group
and decreases effect magnitudes if landlords in the LD subsample are
more likely than non-LD landlords to discriminate, we find that the main
results are not materially affected when the LD subsample is excluded. See
the appendix for full results.
9. These are based on the distribution of ads by borough as identified
in a pilot study: 35% Manhattan, 30% Brooklyn, 20% Queens, 10% Bronx,
and 5% Staten Island.
10. In a pilot study, we found that initial contact rates for e-mailed
inquiries were extremely low.
11. We matched testers’ assumed credit score range, income level, house-
hold composition, occupation, perceived employment stability, gender,
interpersonal skills, and perceived age.
Volume 81 Number 1 January 2019 / 131ing and making salient the costs of noncompliance such that
they are perceived to be greater than the costs of compliance
(e.g., Dixit 2006; Hadfield and Weingast 2014; Weaver 2014,
2015). Prior research evaluating the effectiveness of similar
official communication campaigns has shown that appeals
highlighting the costs of noncompliance can, under certain
circumstances, induce greater compliance with the law in
domains such as paying taxes (Blumenthal et al. 2001; Iyer,
Reckers, and Sanders 2010; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Chris-
tian 2001; but see Dunning et al. 2015) and paying delinquent
fines (Haynes et al. 2013). On the other hand, a growing line of
social psychological research challenges this expectation and
argues that coercive sanctions to induce behavioral change
may backfire and instead crowd out social norms needed to
motivate pro-social behavior (e.g., Bowles 2016; Cardenas,
Stranlund, andWillis 2000; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Thus,
while we gather direct evidence on the effect of the punitive
treatment, this can be interpreted as the effect of costs, c, only
under the assumption of no differential effects, relative to the
monitoring treatment, on b and p.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Partnering with the City of New York, we designed and
analyzed data from a field experiment in which the city ran-
domly sent targeted messages to landlords associated with a
specific advertised rental unit, which is pursued by a trio of
matched testers who vary by race. The matched audit pro-
vides leverage to measure racial discrimination, which we
operationalize as differential landlord behavior toward testers
by the tester’s race for the same advertised unit. This section
describes the experiment’s setting, design, implementation,
and analysis.
Study context
New York City is a useful political setting for testing the ef-
fectiveness of governmental campaigns encouraging com-
pliance with fair housing law. It is well known for having one
of the strongest antidiscrimination laws in the country (Gu-
rian 2005). The agency enforcing the city’s antidiscrimination
law, theNewYorkCity Commission onHumanRights, is also
well known among real estate professionals for having the
capacity and willingness to enforce fair housing law. Thus,
receiving any targeted and personalized treatment phone
message from this city government is arguably perceived as a
credible signal of increased government effort to monitor land-
lords and enforce fair housing law. We focus on rental list-
ings posted on the online classified advertising site Craigslist.
While Craigslist is one of multiple sources of classified rental
advertisements, it is one of the primary forums used to post
and pursue rental listings in general and in New York City.All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Audit design
We briefly summarize how rental listings are sampled from
Craigslist and how they are pursued by matched auditors.7
On each day of the study’s implementation, a set of rental
housing ads from the current day was selected from Craigs-
list using an automated script. First, using keywords, a list of
“likely discrimination” (LD) ads were identified and selected
with 100% probability, with the goal of increasing statistical
power if baseline discrimination levels were low.8 Second,
among the remainder of ads posted on Craigslist that day
(excluding those identified in the LD search), a sample of ads
was randomly drawn in a way that was representative of the
distribution of advertised vacant rental housing stock by
New York City borough.9 Only advertisements that invited
housing seekers to reply by phone were pursued.10
Testers responded to sampled ads posing as individuals
interested in renting the listed apartment. A project manager
prescreened all sampled ads against a master database of prior
audits to ensure that there were no duplicate landlords or
brokers in the sample of ads ever pursued by testers. We refer
to all ads pursued by testers as the “audit sample.” Each ad was
pursued in a randomized order by a matched team of three
testers of the same gender who varied by race: one white, one
black, and one Hispanic.11 By extensively controlling for as-
pects of testers’ assumed biographies within each trio, we em-
ploy a design-based approach to reduce the likelihood that
observed racial discrimination levels are driven by the traits
of specific auditors. Assigned biographies logically consistent
with the rental price and size of the advertised unit were au-
tomatically generated at the time of ad sampling.
Upon reaching an individual when replying to an ad,
testers were instructed to provide limited information about
themselves over the phone, including their assumed name,
interest in pursuing and renting the unit, their availability forand Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
132 / Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Albert H. Fang, Andrew M. Guess, and Macartan Humphreysan in-person viewing, and their financial qualifications to
rent.12 Testers were instructed to schedule an in-person ap-
pointment on the same day at the earliest convenience of the
individual with whom they were speaking. If testers were
asked about other biographical attributes, they volunteered
that information accordingly.
When all three testers in a matched team successfully
secured an appointment to view the same advertised housing
unit with the same landlord, the landlord associated with
that unit was admitted into the experiment (i.e., the “ex-
perimental sample”) and randomly assigned to a treatment
condition. We refer to the landlord-housing unit (and thus
the unit of randomization) as a “case.” Testers then made
their individually scheduled appointments, viewed the unit,
interacted with the subject, and recorded their interactions
afterward. Testers were blind to treatment, but they were not
blind to the city’s interest in assessing discrimination as one
of numerous characteristics of the rental market. As such,
they were extensively instructed and coached not to fish for
particular reactions, not to let their personal opinions about
landlord behavior interfere with their ability to continue
interactions during the audit, and not to raise suspicions of
an audit.
Randomization procedure and definition
of treatments
Landlords admitted into the experiment were randomly as-
signed to one of three conditions: a control condition where
nomessage was sent, a monitoringmessaging condition, or a
punitive messaging condition. A block randomization pro-
cedure was used in which blocks were defined by the ad’s
stratum and by treatment regime.13 Table A1 (tables A1–A23
are available online in the appendix) shows the distribution
of cases across blocks and arms.14
Treatment scripts contain official language that the city
uses to communicate aspects of fair housing law to the pub-12. Testers had an assumed first name and an assumed last name for the
duration of the study. Both were randomly drawn from a database of names
tagged with racial and ethnic identifiers (see the appendix for details).While
testers were screened at the time of hire such that their manner of speaking
did not strongly signal a particular racial identity over the phone, testers’
assumed names did contain a signal of their race (Butler and Homola 2017;
Fryer and Levitt 2004).
13. Strata were a New York City borough or the LD oversample. The
treatment regime is defined as a distinct design and randomization pro-
cedure. See fig. A2 for details.
14. We verified the randomization was valid using randomization in-
ference. The probability of obtaining a log-likelihood statistic (from a
multinomial logistic regression of treatment assignment on 122 pretreat-
ment covariates) at least as large as the observed test statistic is p p :97.
Balance tables are presented in the appendix.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms lic.15 In both the monitoring and punitive conditions, a city
employee delivered the assigned appeal via a personalized,
targeted phonemessage to the landlord. Calls were sent about
two hours after testers successfully scheduled appointments
over the phone and about two hours before the first scheduled
appointment. In the monitoring condition, the treatment
script verified that the subject was on the line, informed the
subject that the call was from the New York City Commission
on Human Rights “as part of an ongoing informational cam-
paign to remind landlords and brokers of their obligations
under fair housing law,” and provided the commission’s web
address for more information. While the monitoring message
does not provide specific information about what exactly is
illegal and is in fact designed to avoid priming subjects to think
about racial discrimination in particular, our prior is that most
of the subjects already knew about fair housing law in the
absence of treatment.16 Thus, the monitoring message can be
interpreted as an intensive intervention that makes salient in-
junctive norms surrounding fair housing law simply by in-
voking it. In the punitive condition, the treatment script was
the same as the monitoring treatment script but includes, be-
fore providing the commission’s web address, the following
advisement emphasizing the punitive power of the state and
the potential pecuniary costs of violating the law: “It is illegal to
discriminate against a person seeking housing due to their
membership in a protected class. If you are found to have
broken the law, you may be ordered to pay damages, provide
reasonable accommodation, or incur civil penalties of up to
$250,000.”
Data and measurement
We combine the following data: (1) scraped data on adver-
tised rental listings, (2) automated assumed biographical and
treatment assignment data, (3) data on treatment delivery
and compliance, and (4) detailed field reports testers recorded
about their interactions with landlords before the visit (pre-
treatment), during a housing unit visit (posttreatment), and
after the visit (posttreatment).17 We construct case-level mea-
sures of net discrimination, which is defined as the difference
in favorable treatment between the majority and minority group
tester in any matched pair. We apply this measurement strategy
to construct two objective measures of discrimination, which we
prespecified as our primary posttreatment outcome measures:15. See the appendix for the full text of the treatment scripts.
16. This is because brokers, who comprise nearly 85% of experimental
subjects, are required to demonstrate knowledge of fair housing law to be
licensed in New York and because Craigslist shows advisory language
stating that discrimination is illegal to those posting rental ads.
17. Full details about data collection and measurement procedures are
provided in the appendix.
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(i) to call back and follow upwith testers after the appointment
and (ii) to offer the unit to the tester. These measures are
computed for each majority-minority pairing (white-black,
white-Hispanic, and black-Hispanic) and can take three val-
ues at the case level: 21 if only the minority tester is treated
favorably, 0 if both the minority and majority testers are
treated equally, and 1 if only the majority tester is treated fa-
vorably.18 When examining average levels of the net measure,
1 means 100% net discrimination against the minority group,
21 means 100% net discrimination against the majority group,
and 0means that the two groups are treated equally.19We also
construct pretreatment measures of discrimination that oc-
curs over the phone between the time testers initially contact
the landlord when inquiring about the ad and the time of ran-
dom assignment. We measure early stage discrimination for all
cases testers pursue to describe baseline discrimination levels
and to include as covariates in the experimental analysis.20
Sample definitions
The study was in the field from April 13, 2012, to Decem-
ber 20, 2013. We focus on two key samples for the analysis:
the audit sample, which contains 2,711 cases, and the exper-
imental sample, which contains 653 cases. Figure A1 (figs. A1–
A7 are available online in the appendix) presents a flowdiagram
summarizing the sample filtering procedure, and figure A2
summarizes the cumulative number of cases admitted into the
experimental sample over this period and by treatment regime.
The characteristics and geographic distribution of the rental
housing stock in our samples appear to be broadly similar to the
stock in the New York City rental housing market during this
period.2118. If the landlord did not honor the appointment, the net discrimi-
nation measure is coded 0 (i.e., both in any pair were treated the same as
neither received a callback nor an offer).
19. A concern is that estimates of discrimination levels are driven by
the composition of testers in each racial group. To address this, we esti-
mate a nonnested hierarchical model regressing a landlord-tester level
indicator for favorable treatment on pretreatment covariates and tester,
tester race, and tester team gender random effects. We estimate this model
for each of the objective outcome indicators among the control group and
among the experimental sample. The estimated variance of the varying
tester intercepts is negligible; thus, we infer that the composition of testers
in each racial group does not drive discrimination estimates. See the ap-
pendix for details.
20. Early stage discrimination indicators include differences in mak-
ing initial contact; scheduling an appointment; how many biographical
attributes the landlord asks about; the number and share of attributes
discussed where testers receive positive, negative, neutral, or skeptical
feedback; and whether any negative or skeptical feedback is received.
21. See the appendix for summary statistics of the housing stock
characteristics of listed units by sample.
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We use both design-based and model-based approaches to
estimation and inference, with both approaches producing
near-identical results.22 For design-based (nonparametric)
inference, we estimate sample intent-to-treat (ITT) effects
of government messaging on discrimination levels as the
weighted average across blocks of differences in net dis-
crimination levels between treatment groups within blocks,
where weights are given by block size.23 For this nonpara-
metric analysis, standard errors are calculated using the con-
servative weighted Neyman estimator. In addition, we esti-
mate effects using the following linear model:
Yib p a0 1 b1Tib 1 gb 1 uib; ð1Þ
where i indexes landlords and b indexes the experimental
block; Y is the net discrimination outcome measure; T is
treatment assignment, variously definedwhen comparingmean
outcomes between monitoring versus control, punitive ver-
sus control, or punitive versus monitoring; g is a full set of
block fixed effects; and u is a disturbance term. We estimate
equation (1) on the subset of the data assigned to each pair of
treatment arms being compared; b1 is the effect of the treat-
ment group relative to the comparison group. For this anal-
ysis we again use inverse propensity weights. We calculate
p-values corresponding to a one-sided test of the null hy-
pothesis of equality of means for the monitoring-control and
punitive-control comparisons. We also calculate p-values cor-
responding to a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of equal-
ity of means for the punitive-monitoring comparison and for
all analyses involving net discrimination against Hispanic (vs.
black) testers because we have no strong priors about the ex-
pected direction of racial bias and treatment effects on racial
bias when comparing the experiences of black and Hispanic
testers.
RESULTS
Figure 1 summarizes themain findings and shows, separately
for each outcome measure, (1) levels of favorable treatment
for different racial groups (top-left quadrant), (2) differences
in favorable treatment rates between groups (i.e., net dis-
crimination levels) by treatment assignment (lower left),
(3) differences in favorable treatment rates across treatment22. Additional analyses are described and reported in the discussion
and in the appendix.
23. We observe some noncompliance because some landlords assigned
to a call hung upmidcall or because the city staffer delivering calls could not
reach the landlord before tester appointments. Because the estimated share
of compliers is relatively high (between 71% and 81%), complier average
causal effect estimates are similar to ITT estimates and are shown in the
appendix.
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treatment assignment on net discrimination levels relative to
the control or monitoring comparison group (lower right).24
We focus our discussion on the lower-left and lower-right
quadrants in particular, which present estimates of baseline24. Estimates corresponding to the information presented in fig. 1 are
shown in the appendix.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms net discrimination levels and of ITT effects of messaging on
net discrimination levels, respectively.We also draw attention
to our most important findings in the figure by highlighting
key estimates.
Baseline discrimination levels
First we assess baseline levels of discrimination in the out-
come variables by examining the control group mean levelsFigure 1. Main results on discrimination levels and treatment effects. A, Net discrimination in receiving callbacks; B, net discrimination in receiving offers.
Each panel shows levels of favorable treatment for different racial groups (top-left quadrant), differences in favorable treatment rates between groups (i.e.,
net discrimination levels) by treatment assignment (lower-left quadrant), differences in favorable treatment rates across treatment conditions for the same
group (top-right quadrant), and the effects of treatment assignment on net discrimination levels relative to the control or monitoring comparison group
(lower-right quadrant), with weighted nonparametric estimates shown using open markers and inverse probability weighted regression estimates adjusted
using block fixed effects shown using filled markers. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Our main quantities of interest are highlighted in gray.and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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mean difference in favorable treatment rates between groups,
as shown the lower-left quadrants in figure 1. Here we find
statistically significant differences between Hispanic and white
testers. We estimate that Hispanic testers were less likely than
white testers to receive a callback from a landlord or broker—
in 14.9% of cases compared to 21.3%, a difference of 6.4 per-
centage points (p p :014). They were also less likely to re-
ceive an offer for an apartment—in 6.4% of cases compared to
11.3%, a difference of 4.9 percentage points (p p :031). We
find smaller, and statistically weaker, differences between black
andwhite testers.We estimate that black testers were less likely
than white testers to receive a callback from a landlord or
broker—in 16.8% of cases compared to 21.5%, a difference of
4.6 percentage points (p p :115). Black testers were also less
likely to receive an offer—in 9.3% of cases compared to 11.3%,
a difference of nearly 2.0 percentage points (p p :418).
We can compare baseline levels of discrimination in call-
backs to estimates of differential treatment in receiving a
follow-up from the 2012 HUD audit of ethnic and racial
discrimination in rental markets.25 Our results run counter
to the New York metropolitan area estimates from the 2012
HUD audit, which found that Hispanic testers received a
follow-up from agents more frequently than white testers (in
6.9% and 5.4% of cases, respectively, a difference of21.5 per-
centage points, p p :804) and that black testers received a
follow-up from agents more frequently than white testers
(in 10.2% and 3.9% of cases, respectively, or a difference of
26.3 points, p p :096; Turner et al. 2013, 157–58). These
differences in apparent baseline levels of discrimination might
be due to two factors. First, the two estimates may be com-
paring discrimination baseline levels for two different pop-
ulations in the New York area rental market. The HUD es-
timates for the New York City area correspond to the New
York/northeast New Jerseymetropolitan area and not to New
York City specifically. Our estimates are specific to New York
City, and in particular to landlords and agents who post ads
on Craigslist and who schedule appointments with all three
testers pursuing the listing. Second, there is less variability in
our estimates than in the New York area estimates from the
HUD audit since the sample size of our control group is
nearly twice the size of the entire New York HUD audit.
When comparing our estimates to national estimates of dis-
crimination in follow-ups from the 2012 HUD study, the
estimates are similar in that black and Hispanic testers were
less likely to receive follow-ups from agents than white test-
ers: 10.5% for black testers versus 11.0% for white testers, a25. No comparable measure of discrimination in offers exists in the
HUD audit study.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms difference of 0.6 percentage points that is not significant at the
0.05 level; and 7.9% for Hispanic testers versus 11.2% for
white testers, a difference of 3.3 percentage points that is
significant at the 0.1 level (Turner et al. 2013, 44, 47).
Does government messaging reduce
racial discrimination?
Next, we report estimates of the effect of messaging on net
discrimination levels, as shown in the lower-right quadrants
in figure 1. This quadrant presents weighted nonparametric
estimates (open markers) and regression estimates adjusted
using block fixed effects and inverse probability weighting
(filled markers; our preferred specification) with 95% CIs.26
When compared to a pure control condition, sending a
monitoringmessage decreases net discrimination against both
black and Hispanic testers (vs. white testers) across the ob-
jective outcome measures, but mean effect estimates are sub-
stantively negligible and not statistically distinguishable from
zero. Sending amonitoring signal decreases net discrimination
against black testers in receiving a callback (20.006, p p :897)
and in receiving an offer (20.004, p p :903). For Hispanic
testers, sending the monitoring message decreases net dis-
crimination in receiving a callback (20.037, p p :412) and
receiving an offer (20.019, p p :586).
The results on punitive messaging point generally to
reductions in discrimination against Hispanics but increases
in discrimination against blacks. Sending a punitive message
increases net discrimination against black testers (vs. white
testers) across the outcome measures when compared to the
control, but none of these effects are statistically significant
at the 5% level. Sending the punitive message reduces the
likelihood of receiving a postvisit follow-up callback from
the landlord (0.02, p p :679) and reduces the likelihood of
receiving a postvisit offer (0.018, p p :624). Punitive mes-
saging instead decreases net discrimination against Hispanic
testers in receiving a postvisit callback (20.066, p p :056)
and in receiving a postvisit offer (20.023, p p :522). The
effect of punitive messaging on net discrimination in re-
ceiving a postvisit callback is just shy of significance at 5%
(p p :056). Notably, sending a punitive message worsens
outcomes for black compared to Hispanic testers across the
outcome measures. Punitive messaging decreases net dis-
crimination against Hispanic testers relative to black testers
in receiving callbacks (20.083, p p :049) and in receiving
offers (20.040, p p :247). Note that of these two estimated
treatment effects, only the effect on callbacks is statistically
significant at the 5% level (p p :049).26. We focus on the latter in our exposition of results, because both
yield qualitatively similar results.
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tive versus monitoring messaging. It is clear from figure 1
that there is no statistically distinguishable difference in
the effectiveness of the two treatments. We find mixed re-
sults when comparing outcomes between the two treatment
groups—black testers do slightly worse when interacting
with landlords in the punitive condition as compared to the
monitoring condition, while Hispanic testers do slightly
better. All p-values for these objective outcomes range from
0.261 to 0.984.
Hidden discrimination: Estimates using
subjective measures
Our primary analysis focuses on the causal effects of gov-
ernment messaging on two objective measures of racial dis-
crimination in the housing market. Focusing on objective
measures is important in part because discrimination in the
housing market can be relatively invisible (Fair Housing Jus-
tice Center 2013; Freiberg 2015). We also have access to a set
of subjective measures of discrimination that capture, among
other aspects of the housing search process, subjects’ percep-
tions of steering. As such, they reflect both the behavior of the
landlords, which may be a function of treatment conditions,
and the dispositions of confederates to notice and report
indicators of discrimination, which is not subject to treatment
conditions but may be associated with racial group member-
ship. The measures, while rich, are also flawed in that they
suffer from substantial missingness (on the order of 25%–
30%).27While missingness is not correlated with racial groups
or treatment arms, it is still plausibly related to potential
outcomes: testers may be less likely to report if they felt either
little or substantial discrimination.
With this caveat in mind, in figure A3, we report mes-
saging effects on an index measure of testers’ subjective per-
ceptions of favorable treatment and a net discrimination mea-
sure using the subjective index.28 Although on the objective
measures there is strong evidence for discrimination against
Hispanics, this does not appear at all in the subjective mea-
sures. Moreover, while there is some evidence for discrimi-
nation against blacks from the objective measures, for the
subjective measure, blacks report, if anything, better treatment
than whites. Our results are consistent with the dominant
viewpoint in the field, but they also have implications for the27. We refer the reader to the appendix for an analysis of missingness
on subjective measures.
28. We use an index measure to avoid a multiple comparisons problem.
We conduct and report this analysis to maintain fidelity to our preanalysis
plan and to situate our main results in a broader policy context. Details
about the procedures related to this analysis are shown in the appendix.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms generality of our findings. The difficulty of identifying dis-
crimination based on subjective perceptions may be one
factor that makes the punitive threat of law relatively weak,
even if there are normative benefits. Different effects may
arise in areas where identifying violations is easier.
DISCUSSION
Research on the political economy of race in the United
States has shown that racial discrimination plays a central
role in perpetuating racial inequalities, but it has long over-
looked questions about whether government efforts to re-
duce discrimination have been effective. We therefore con-
duct the first experimental test of two common government
strategies to preemptively induce behavioral compliance with
the law in the domain of fair housing. Partnering with the
City of New York, we assess whether government campaigns
that invoke fair housing law and make salient the costs of vio-
lating the law reduce racial discrimination levels in the New
York City rental market. The design offers a strong test be-
cause it (1) individually targets appeals at potential discrim-
inators using live calls, (2) measures outcomes soon after the
treatment is delivered, and (3) occurs in a policy context in
which government’s monitoring and enforcement signals are
credible.
First, in the absence of government intervention, we find
strong evidence of discrimination in the New York City rental
market on outcomes that are consequential for racial housing
inequality. In the control group, Hispanics are less likely than
blacks, who are themselves less likely than whites, to receive
favorable treatment from landlords. In terms of the objective
outcome measures, we find strong evidence of discrimination
in the New York City rental market, particularly against His-
panics. They are 6.4 percentage points less likely to receive a
callback and 4.9 percentage points less likely to receive an offer
for an apartment than whites. These findings stand in contrast
to estimates of discrimination levels from a comparable audit
study of the New York metropolitan area rental market in
2012, which reports no discrimination against blacks or La-
tinos in receiving a callback. We also find suggestive, but not
strong, evidence that punitive government messaging cam-
paigns that both invoke the law and make salient the costs of
violating the law can reduce net discrimination in receiving a
callback from a landlord following an appointment, but only
for Hispanics. We find no statistically distinguishable differ-
ence between the effects of punitive andmonitoringmessaging
relative to a control.29 We assess the robustness of our main29. Employing a conservative Bonferroni approach to multiple com-
parisons across treatments, outcomes, and groups, we fail to reject the null
that these treatments make no difference.
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 81 Number 1 January 2019 / 137results (from preregistered analyses) to alternative estimation
strategies that, at least in principle, improve efficiency; our
main results are not materially affected by the choice of esti-
mator.30
Despite the lack of statistical significance, the magnitudes
of the estimated messaging effects we observe in this study
appear to be substantively significant both in relative terms
and in terms of the mean level of discrimination under treat-
ment. In relative terms, the effects are very large, albeit from a
small baseline.31 Punitive messaging reduces discrimination
against Hispanics relative to whites by 109% and relative to
blacks by 126%. Not only is there a large relative decrease in
net discrimination against Hispanics, but the sign of the pre-
dicted group mean changes from positive to negative, sug-
gesting more favorable treatment for Hispanics relative to
whites and blacks under the punitive messaging condition.
Alternatively we can adduce the substantive meaning of ef-
fects by interpreting the mean discrimination level under
treatment. Our estimates of discrimination levels on key mea-
sures drop to zero under the punitive condition. This creates
an inferential puzzle for policy makers as well as a need for
further experimental replication, which we discuss below as
well. In the remainder of the article, we address concerns re-
garding the internal and external validity of our findings, im-
plications for policymakers, and directions for future research.
Addressing internal validity concerns
about spillovers
The main threat to internal validity arises if the noninter-
ference assumption is violated, which could occur if land-
lords assigned to a messaging condition communicate with
other landlords (who are assigned to other arms) about the
treatment message they received.We use twomain strategies
to show that such interference is unlikely given the sheer size
of the New York City rental market and the sampling pro-
cedures.32 First, we estimate that the probability a landlord or
broker enters the audit sample is between 3.2% and 15% and
that the probability a landlord or broker enters the experi-
ment sample is between 0.77% and 3.6%. Second, we char-30. First, using all the data we estimate models using binary treatment
indicators, block fixed effects, and inverse probability weights, thus al-
lowing for possible efficiency gains from tighter block effect estimation.
Second, we use a lasso regression as a principled method for covariate
selection and then estimate covariate-adjusted ITT effects. See the ap-
pendix for full results.
31. Interpreting treatment effects as relative differences offers an al-
ternative substantive interpretation and is customary in experimental
analyses. See the appendix for full results.
32. Methodological details and additional analyses are in the appen-
dix.
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sample of landlords and brokers in the New York City rental
market. Because the actual number of active landlords and
brokers in the New York City rental market is unknown, we
estimate a conservative upper bound to proxy the denomi-
nator. We infer that the experiment sample must be far less
than 2% of the estimated population of landlords and
brokers in the New York City rental market. Taken together,
these estimates suggest a low probability of between-subject
interaction and make a strong prima facie case for minimal
interference.
Addressing external validity concerns
Next, we address concerns related to external validity de-
riving from the ways study samples are constructed. Al-
though care was taken to sample ads randomly from the
universe of Craigslist rental listings, there are several scope
conditions that limit the generalizability of our findings.
First, our results are limited to ads placed via public listings
on Craigslist, which is a subset of advertised market-rate
rental units and excludes discrimination involving non-
public tenant search processes and discrimination in the
subsidized rental market. This would underestimate dis-
crimination levels under the assumption that landlords who
post rental ads on Craigslist are likely to be less discrimi-
natory than those who select into nonpublic modes of ad-
vertising.33
Second, our findings are also limited to landlords and
brokers who require housing seekers to reply to rental ads
by phone.34 This is a scope condition on our findings, and
future research should explicitly assess whether findings
differ by the mode of initial contact. Third, a possibly rel-
evant factor is that Craigslist employs its own antidiscrim-
ination messaging, which is shown to users before posting
and acknowledges federal, state, and city prohibitions on
discrimination.35 If this messaging deters would-be discrim-
inators from advertising on Craigslist, then this would bias
our estimates of baseline discrimination levels downward. If
it simply changes the ways in which landlords and brokers
advertise, then this makes the evidence for discrimination all
the more striking, as the discrimination we uncover cannot33. This is consistent with research documenting the role of segre-
gated informal social networks in employment and housing search pro-
cesses (Loury 2001; Pager and Shepherd 2008).
34. We estimate that 55.8% of New York City rental listings on
Craigslist require contact by phone. See the appendix for details.
35. The message states, in part: “It is illegal to discriminate in the sale,
rental or leasing of housing because of a person’s race, color, creed, na-
tional origin, sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, or religion.”
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
138 / Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Albert H. Fang, Andrew M. Guess, and Macartan Humphreysbe readily detected from simple text analysis.36 It is also pos-
sible that Craigslist’s messaging, by having effects of its own
on discrimination and reducing the baseline level of discrim-
ination, reduces the magnitude of the effect of government
messaging. If this is the case, then our results should be in-
terpreted as evidence of the effects of government messaging
in a context in which nongovernmental messaging also exists.
Fourth, our experiment applied treatment only after ap-
pointments were scheduled, to avoid differential attrition.
This might have the effect of limiting the generalizability of
our analysis to encounters in which early stage discrimina-
tion was absent. We can address this concern by assessing
discrimination toward testers occurring over the phone be-
fore randomization—that is, across the full audit sample.
Table A2 summarizes these findings and shows an overall
lack of difference in early stage discrimination. We find no
statistically significant differences in the likelihood of mak-
ing any contact when first replying to an advertisement by
phone. And differences in success in setting up appointments
were very small: the only significant difference from three
comparisons is between white and black testers, with black
testers somewhat more successful at scheduling appointments
(36.1% vs. 34.8%, p p :035). These results provide greater
confidence that our results are not driven by sample selection
resulting from all three testers successfully scheduling appoint-
ments.
Finally, given the potential rarity of both encountering
a set of auditors and receiving a targeted phone call from
the government, there may be concerns that landlords are
“spooked” by the intervention. Being spooked by the matched
auditors does not threaten the internal validity of the exper-
imental results because the design maintains measurement
symmetry across all arms.37 Being spooked by the targeted call
from the government is not a concern because it is part of the
net effect of the bundled treatment that we are interested in
understanding.38
Policy implications
What are the policy implications of our findings? The re-
sults on discrimination levels are relatively clear for policy
makers: discrimination is a greater concern in New York36. However, other work suggests that some discriminatory text sur-
vives (Oliveri 2010).
37. This could mean our estimates of discrimination levels in the
control group are downwardly biased and could be interpreted as conser-
vative estimates.
38. There may also be an interaction effect between encountering
auditors and getting a targeted call, but we remain agnostic about that effect
and recommend future research to understand it.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms than previously believed, and thismay be true elsewhere also.
The evidence is especially strong for Hispanics. The impli-
cations for interventions are less clear but just as important.
The challenge here is that there is suggestive evidence of
strong effects, but many of the estimated effects do not hit
conventional levels of significance despite the large scale of
this experiment. Power issues loom large when the behavior
of interest, discrimination, is relatively rare and is itself esti-
mated with uncertainty. In such cases relying on conventional
standards of significance may be overly conservative—an is-
sue that has been of concern also in the study of rare diseases
and has led to calls to alter standards in such cases (Gobburu
and Pastoor 2016). Rather than altering standards, we cal-
culate appropriate beliefs that the intervention is effective
using a Bayesian framework by estimating the probability of a
hypothesis (that each messaging strategy is effective) given
the data. This is a quantity fundamentally distinct from the
probability of the data given a hypothesis, which is the quan-
tity of interest for determining statistical significance (Gill
1999). Understanding this alternative question is plausibly
more relevant to policy makers who care about the proba-
bility that a given intervention works, rather than the prob-
ability of rejecting a specified null hypothesis. Importantly,
we clarify that this is not a method to fish for statistically
significant results but is instead a method to answer a sub-
stantively distinct question that can be used following future
replications (given a cumulation of experimental data) to
improve how policy makers form posterior beliefs about the
effectiveness of different interventions.
Figure 2 plots the posterior densities along with the esti-
mated probabilities of effectiveness (see the appendix for de-
tails about our methodology). In the bottom row, we see that,
for each distribution, approximately half or less of the prob-
abilitymass lies below zero: the data are not highly informative
for posterior beliefs that either monitoring or punitive mes-
sages reduce discrimination against blacks. In the case of pu-
nitive messages, roughly two-thirds of probability mass lies
above zero for both callbacks and offers, providing some in-
dication that the treatment may have even increased discrim-
ination against black testers. The top row shows a different
story for Hispanics. For callbacks especially, the bulk of prob-
ability mass—at least 77%—lies beneath zero, implying pos-
terior beliefs that the messages reduced discrimination against
that group. We can be most confident in posterior beliefs
about the effectiveness of the punitive treatment in reducing
discrimination against Hispanics in callbacks: around 94% of
the mass lies below zero, centered around the posterior mean
reduction in discrimination of 6.6 points. For reference, that
estimate is roughly twice the corresponding posterior mean
reduction due to the monitoring treatment.and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Finally, we outline several directions for future research.
First, an important limitation of the current field experiment
is that despite the unusually large scale of our study (in com-
parison to prior in-person rental market audits), there is
not enough statistical power in the design to detect treatment
effects on the order of about 6 points. This is in part because
the control group mean discrimination level is relatively low
and because estimating treatment effects involves, in effect,
estimating an interaction between tester race and treatment.
As this is the first field experiment of its kind, it was not
possible to conduct ex ante power analyses using previously
reported effect sizes as benchmarks.39 Additional experimental
replications with larger sample sizes are needed to precisely
estimate discrimination levels and messaging effects.
Second, additional research is needed to understand
whether differential effects for Hispanic and black housing39. Instead, the study was designed with the reasonable ex ante ex-
pectation that it was adequately powered to detect and reduce racial
discrimination levels reported in rental market audit studies published
before the start of the study. See the appendix for details on studies
informing our priors.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms seekers exist.40 Existing work on the politics of policy en-
forcement and compliance does not explicitly develop ex-
planations for why attempts to induce compliance with
antidiscrimination lawmight vary by the group membership
of the target of discrimination. Future work should develop
and test hypotheses about the conditions under which there
exists variation in baseline discrimination levels and het-
erogeneous effects of governmental appeals by tester and
landlord group membership.41
Third, the treatments we tested in this study were, given
practical considerations and constraints, bundled. They also
did not test the full range of potential strategies government
could deploy in preemptive messaging campaigns to reduce
discrimination. Future studies could more finely operation-
alize treatments to test specific parameters in the decision-
theoretic model that build on existing theoretical frame-
works from literatures on prejudice reduction (Paluck andFigure 2. Posterior densities of treatment effects on discrimination against Hispanics (top) and African Americans (bottom) relative to whites. Columns
correspond to combinations of outcome measure (callbacks, offers) and treatment message (punitive, monitoring) relative to a control. The area under the
curve below zero is shaded in each plot, and the mean of each posterior density is shown with a dotted line. Each posterior is estimated via 10,000 Monte
Carlo draws from the marginal distribution of b1 conditional on j
2 and y given improper uniform priors, b1jj2; y
e
N(b̂1;Vb1j
2).40. Given space constraints, we speculate on possible explanations for
mixed findings in the appendix.
41. See the appendix for an exploratory analysis of heterogeneous
messaging effects by the perceived race of landlords, using the data from
this experiment.
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
140 / Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Albert H. Fang, Andrew M. Guess, and Macartan HumphreysGreen 2009) and on behavioral policy compliance (Weaver
2014, 2015). Future studies could also test whether effects
vary by the mode of treatment delivery or by the messenger
of the appeal.
Finally, replication in other housing markets and political
jurisdictions would be valuable to understand how messag-
ing effects vary across political and economic contexts. There
may be different baseline discrimination levels and reasons
why market actors discriminate that moderate their behav-
ioral response to governmental appeals. There may also be
different expectations among market actors about the cred-
ibility of government efforts to enforce antidiscrimination
laws. How citizens perceive the capacity of the state to en-
force compliance (Weaver 2014) and the degree of govern-
ment forbearance in the domain of civil rights (Holland
2016)—which are partly a function of the incentives and
preferences of bureaucrats and their principals (Einstein and
Glick 2016; Mummolo 2018; White, Nathan, and Faller
2015)—may affect how they perceive the credibility of gov-
ernment signals to monitor market behavior and enforce the
law, the expected intensity of government efforts to do so,
and ultimately the costs of violating the law.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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